

# Trustable Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for Secure Community and Applications


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# ASEAN IVO Trustable Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for Secure Community and Applications -TGSCA

- GNSS (GPS, Beidou, QZSS, Galileo etc.) is the baseline technology to provide position, timing and velocity (PVT) to essential smart initiatives such as




**Under Spoofing Attack**



**A \$200 spoofer can mimic the set of fake GNSS satellites to change the PVT**




- Various ASEAN Countries suffers GNSS spoofing threat. E.g
  - Malaysia
    - GRAB drivers steal bookings from other drivers [1]
    - GRAB drivers give their fake location to GRAB company [1]
    - Collision of the crude oil tanker Zephyr I along Malacca Strait[2]
    - Masquerade as potential GRAB driver to customer [3]
  - Indonesia & Singapore
    - Driver spoofed their location to GOJEK so that customer at their preferred location can be assigned to them [4]




• **Targets of the proposed solution**

- Provide authentic GNSS signal [5]
  - any company and applications that make use of GNSS such as transportation company e.g. GRAB
  - any GNSS users especially ladies and kids
  - National infrastructures such as 5G/6G system etc.




HackRF transceiver in the car to spoof own location or nearby vehicle



Crude oil tanker Zephyr I and the fully-cellular GSL Grania collided in the waters of Batu Pahat, Malaysia, at around 20:37 GTM on September 26, 2022.


# Proposed Method: Digital Signature for authentic, trusted GNSS signal

- Provide GNSS Navigation Message Authentication over Continuously Operating Reference Station (CORS) network
  - A phase 1 prototype development for Singapore Land Authority (SLA) CORS Network (around 8), by University of Glasgow, Singapore, Nanyang Technological University and The University of Tokyo




# Proposed Method: Digital Signature for authentic, trusted GNSS signal

## Experimental Campaign Setup Trial




$M_i$  : the new GPS message to be received

- Step 1 : Server Compute hash key and HMAC digital signature for Message  $i$ ,  $HK_i$ ,  $HMAC(M_i)$
- Step 2 : Store  $HK_i$ ,  $HMAC(M_i)$  in database
- Step 3 : Client requests hash key and HMAC digital signature for Message  $i$ .
- Step 4 : Client creates digital signature of incoming message  $M_i$  and spoofed message  $M_s$  with hash key. It compares the digital signature of spoof message and authentic message  $i$ . **Spoofer message  $M_s$  digital signature cannot be matched with those stored ->  $M_s$  is invalid/spoofed signal**



Spoofer using HackRF





Both server and client are receiving navigation mess

GNSS Digital Signature using Chamelon Hashing for Server and Client Setup



# Proposed Method: Digital Signature for Authentic, trusted GNSS signal

- **Experimental Campaign Setup Trial**
  - Evaluation and Experiment result at NTU@S2 Rooftop




- Project required KPI authentication success rate is **95%**
  - Authentication success rate is **99.4% for IoT device**
  - Authentication success rate is **99.0% for Android phone**
- Rejected

## Authentication





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Subframe 1 received from SVs: 10, 16, 23, 26, 27, 28
Subframe 2 received from SVs: 10, 16, 23, 26, 27, 28
Subframe 3 received from SVs: 10, 16, 23, 26, 28, 32
Subframe 4 received from SVs: 10, 16, 23, 26, 28, 31, 32
Subframe 5 received from SVs: 10, 16, 23, 26, 28, 31, 32
Frames received from SVs: 10, 16, 23, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32
GPS SVID 10 [Subframes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] sent to server
GPS SVID 16 [Subframes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] sent to server
GPS SVID 23 [Subframes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] sent to server
GPS SVID 26 [Subframes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] sent to server
GPS SVID 27 [Subframes 1, 2] sent to server
GPS SVID 28 [Subframes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] sent to server
GPS SVID 31 [Subframes 4, 5] sent to server
GPS SVID 32 [Subframes 3, 4, 5] sent to server
Attempting to authenticate frames...
New key verified: 0474D07AD9DB9C28D016F0991747BC85A354F245300518D21A32780BC21C24DCB61EE5FC8D81DDCCD
2ED447F1064EB2D9EAF0856CA9D767780375FFCA76350AE
Using R Prime: DA62C8D4E96FB41871A783AAA2FD592E253C5EB351BCFDEE68B19B70634301211F5585D6ED8C7C78FEC
57A69A79478B23BB7A57717182DE847C9C178A52327
Verification Success: Frame 10 [Subframes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Verification Success: Frame 16 [Subframes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Verification Success: Frame 23 [Subframes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Verification Success: Frame 26 [Subframes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Verification Success: Frame 27 [Subframes: 1, 2]
Verification Success: Frame 28 [Subframes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Verification Success: Frame 31 [Subframes: 4, 5]
Verification Success: Frame 32 [Subframes: 3, 4, 5]
LATTITUDE/LONGITUDE: 1.3420233, 103.6808624
    
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# Impact: Trustable GNSS for CORS implementation in Malaysia


- **The Technological Success of Phase 1 Prototype with at least 95% Authentication Success**
  - Exploring the outreach of the proposed GNSS authentication methodology to adapt to CORS network in Malaysia [6] since there are
    - 97 CORS stations for MyRTKnet (JUPEM) , 21 CORS stations for SGeDNet (Sarawak Land & Survey)
    - 6 CORS stations for SISPELSAT( MarineDepartment), 1 CORS station for GBAS (Civil Aviation Authority Malaysia)
  - Through leverage on some of the 23 R&D CORS network for phase prototyping and implementation



23 R&D CORS Network station as a platform to develop space based applications for the country among Government, agencies, universities and industry

- **Technological/ Societal Impact for Phase 1.0 (Singapore) and Phase 2.0 (Malaysia)**
  - Singapore
    - The acceleration of various smart nation initiatives that rely heavily on GNSS provides the momentum in the expected increase of spoofers.
      - Proposed phase 1 prototype give assurance to SLA end users on the integrity of the GNSS especially on smart construction sector where precise GNSS centimeters accuracy is required for piling and drones building façade inspection.
      - SLA and Govtech end users will be able to develop secure mobile apps for the community
  - Malaysia
    - resolve the above mentioned GNSS threat on
      - Business sustainability for companies and applications such as transportation& delivery company e.g., GRAB.
      - Drivers will be assured of guaranteed livelihood and safety
      - Commuters will be assured of personal safety especially ladies and kids.
      - National Infrastructure reliability and integrity especially growth of GNSS applications and addressing vulnerability is one of the key objectives of Malaysian Space Agency (MYSA)
    - Government Smart initiatives that affect commuters' behaviors and confidence such as Kuching Urban Transportation System (KUTS)-fully autonomous transport system







- **Collaborative Impact for Phase 2.0 (Malaysia)**

- Expand strong collaboration from phase 1 that comprises of University of Glasgow, Singapore, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and The University of Tokyo, Japan with
  - Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM)
  - Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS)
  - Swinburne University of Technology Sarawak Campus (SUTS)
  - CORS network partners in Johor and Sarawak

- **Technological Outcome for TGSCA**

- A new trustable GNSS for secure community and application platform for
  - Johor
    - Leverage on ISKANDARNET CORS
  - Sarawak
    - Leverage on SWGG CORS



1. Android phone
2. IoT devices such as raspberry

- To achieve 95% success in spoofing authentication



- **Societal Outcome for TGSCA**
  - A potential technological incubation platform to develop new customized TGSCA and transfer technology know-how under local context such as for KUTS companies or GNSS cybersecurity startup companies
  - Path the way for future Nation-wide GNSS Big Data Analytics capability where pockets of secure and insecure GNSS signals in different regions can be segregated- Smart Secure Nation
- **Collaborative Outcome for TGSCA**
  - Grow the technology collaboration and partnership among
    - Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
    - University of Glasgow, Singapore
    - The University of Tokyo, Japan
    - Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM)
    - Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS)
    - Swinburne University of Technology Sarawak Campus (SUTS)
    - CORS network partners in Johor and Sarawak

# Conclusion: Trustable Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for Secure Community and Applications-TGSCA

## Targets

- To prevent malicious spoofing by providing authentic GNSS signal to
  - any company and applications that make use of GNSS such as transportation company e.g. GRAB
  - any GNSS users especially ladies and kids
  - National infrastructures such as 5G/6G system etc.

## Method (idea)

- Provide GNSS Navigation Message Authentication over Continuously Operating Reference Station (CORS) network

## Scientific and societal impact

- The novel centralized GNSS digital signature provide integrity and reliability of GNSS
  - To ensure business sustainability and trustworthy of companies and industry
  - To safeguard the livelihood of transportation workers
  - To ensure personal safety for ladies and kids for private ride.
  - National Infrastructure reliability and integrity

## References

- [1] <https://www.malaymail.com/news/money---international/2019/05/17/drivers-use-gps-spoofing-fake-apps-to-defraud-grab-says-ride-sharing-firm/1754081>
- [2] <https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1142375/Subterfuge-tanker-in-collision-with-boxship-in-Malacca-Strait>
- [3] <https://goodyfeed.com/therere-fake-grab-drivers-msia-grab-issue-warnings/>
- [4] <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3479645.3479657>
- [5] Y.H. Chu, S.L. Keoh, C.K.Seow, Q.Cao, K. Wen and S.Y. Tan “GPS Signal Authentication using a Chamelon Hash KeyChain”, International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Proection XV, pp. 209-226, 2022
- [6] A. Napiah, “Malaysia’s GNSS Initiatives”, Fifteenth Meeting of the International Committee on GNSS, 27 Sep – 1 Oct 2021.